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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTRACT PRECAUTIONS  
 






Abstract:  This research tests the intuition that parties to a contract 
approach each other differently before the contract is formed than they do 
once it is finalized. We argue that one of the most important determinants of 
self-protective behavior is whether the promisee considers herself to be in 
negotiations or already in an ongoing contract relationship. That shift affects 
precaution-taking even when it has no practical bearing on the costs and 
benefits of self-protection: the moment of contracting is a reference point that 
frames the costs and benefits of taking precautions. We present the results of 
three questionnaire studies in which respondents indicate that they would be 
more likely to protect their own interests—by requesting a liquidated damages 
clause, by purchasing a warranty, or by shopping around to ensure the best 
deal—when the contract is not yet finalized than they would when they 
understand the agreement to be finalized. We discuss competing explanations 
for this phenomenon, including both prospect theory and cognitive 
dissonance. Finally, we explore some doctrinal implications for work on 
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Before the contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a natural 
wariness. Neither expects the other to be particularly forthcoming, and 
therefore there is no deception when one is not. Afterwards the situation is 
different. The parties are now in a cooperative relationship the costs of 
which will be considerably reduced by a measure of trust. So each lowers 
his guard a little bit, and now silence is more apt to be deceptive . . . 
 
Market Street Associates Limited Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 
1991) (Posner, J.) 
This Article explores one of the central tensions in contract law and policy: 
are counterparties adversaries or partners? On the one hand, courts and 
lawmakers have worried for decades about parties‘ blithe willingness to make 
themselves vulnerable to exploitation.1 The first year contracts course is 
populated by a parade of promisees who believe in contracts that do not exist,2 
agree to outrageous terms that they could not possibly fulfill,3 and over-rely on 
promises that leave them undercompensated when the promisor breaches.4 
Even though most consumers would readily endorse the exhortation of caveat 
emptor, there is evidence that they fail to protect themselves across a variety of 
contractual dealings, with costly results. On the other hand, there are good 
reasons to think that over-formalization, and over-protection, are harmful as 
well. Relying on social norms and interpersonal trust may actually be the most 
efficient approach for many kinds of contracts. 
We approach the contract relationship from the perspective of the 
consumer or promisee, and ask how and when individuals protect themselves 
from contractual harms including breach and exploitation. We hypothesize 
that one of the most important determinants of self-protective behavior is 
whether the promisee considers herself to be in negotiations or already in an 
ongoing contract relationship. That shift affects precaution-taking even when 
it has no practical bearing on the costs and benefits of self-protection. Put 
                                                 
1  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981) (providing a remedy for parties who 
reasonably relied on representations made by parties under an otherwise unenforceable 
agreement; Marco J. Jiminez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669, 671 (2010) (examining over 300 
promissory estoppel cases over a 30 year period to determine how judges conceive of 
equitable claims). 
2 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2n 683 (Wisc. 1965) (awarding 
damages in equity where the defendant encouraged the plaintiff to rely on its unenforceable 
promise). 
3 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(invalidating a contract where terms were unreasonably favorable for the defendant). 
4 See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Mining Co., 385 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962) (awarding 
damages as the diminution in market price of land where performance would be more costly 
than the value of the completed contract). 
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differently, the moment of contracting is a reference point: at moments before 
contracting, we take precautions against harm; afterwards, we lower our 
defenses.  
This research tests and expands on Judge Posner‘s intuition, expressed in 
Market Street Associates, that parties feel and act differently before and after 
entering contracts.5 We build on three interlocking scholarly traditions.  First, 
there is a new literature on contracts as prospect theory reference points that 
frame the parties‘ judgments of the costs and benefits of the deal.6 This 
reference point evidence complements the powerful relational contracting 
literature, which argued that commercial parties behave as if long-term 
contracts are partnerships, and often forgo legal opportunities to take 
exploitative gains.7 Finally, the growing understanding that individuals perceive 
contracts as a set of bilateral moral commitments, rather than merely options 
to pay or perform, strongly suggests that lay people believe that contract 
formation has moral implications.8   
Understanding contract formation as a reference point sheds new light on 
several important live problems in contract doctrine and policy. For example, 
there is a growing field of scholarship worrying about the common practice of 
unilateral modifications in common consumer contracts. As David Horton 
shows, credit card companies were able to roll out arbitration clauses as 
modifications to existing contracts, overcoming initial court resistance through 
sophisticated lawyering.9 This has been deemed worrisome enough that Oren 
Bar-Gill and Kevin Davis have proposed a third-party monitoring mechanism 
to remedy such un-policed unilateral modifications, the ―Change Approval 
Board.‖10 Peter Alces and Michael Greenfield have collected examples of 
unilateral modifications across multiple consumer channels and argued that 
courts should reinvigorate the doctrine of good faith.11 These kinds of 
                                                 
5 Market Street Associates Limited Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991). 
6 Oliver Hart and John Moore , Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2008);  
Oliver Hart, John Moore and Christian Zehnder, Contracts as Reference Points -- Experimental 
Evidence, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 493 (2011); Doron Teichman, Yuval Feldman and Amos 
Schurr, Reference Points and Contractual Interpretation: An Empirical Examination, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1989556 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012) 
(finding that framing payoffs as losses tends to encourage self-serving interpretation of 
contract language). 
7 See infra at text accompanying notes 82 through 83. 
8 See infra Section 3.3 
9 David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA 
L. REV. 605, 665-66 (2010); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 
(2011). 
10 Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2010). 
11 Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use of 
Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099 (2010). 
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proposals are motivated by the sense that unilateral modifications are unlikely 
to be welfare-maximizing, and that they often exploit consumers‘ cognitive 
biases.12 But it has been unclear exactly which cognitive biases affect a 
consumer‘s ability to evaluate modifications.13 What‘s so psychologically 
special about unilateral modification? Our research situates the problem of 
assent to modification within the broader class of contracts decisions that 
people approach skeptically outside of contract but readily accept once the 
main agreement has been signed.  
The approach advocated here also bears on a related debate over the 
merits of mandatory term disclosure. Armed with evidence that consumers 
essentially never read licenses, contracts, or warranties, opponents of 
mandatory disclosure have begun to make inroads against one of the most 
popular regulatory approaches to voluntary transactions.14 Others defend 
disclosure, arguing that it is a cheap and harmless foundation for 
enforcement.15 We suggest that consumers see the relevant terms differently 
depending on when they are presented. Many of the most controversial cases 
tug at the intuition that terms that follow formation—think Carnival Cruise 
Lines16—are particularly problematic. Once parties understand that the 
contract has been formed, they are especially unlikely to take care. In fact, 
clever promisors might be able to manipulate precautionary behavior by 
making the most salient moment of contracting (for example, signing forms or 
exchanging a good for money) precede revelations of objectionable terms. In 
that way, firms can reduce the likelihood that the consumers will engage in 
self-protective behavior like reading the contract, or shopping around, without 
exposing themselves to legal sanctions. As such, reference point theory 
exposes how contract law‘s relentlessly objective focus could permit 
sophisticated parties to manipulate the timing of disclosures without offending 
the legal requirement of mutual assent. 
 In some ways, the idea that formation reorients parties‘ expectations seems 
so anodyne that it may not warrant empirical investigation. However, this 
                                                 
12 See Bar-Gill & Davis supra, note 13 at 20 (―[M]ost consumers are imperfectly informed 
or imperfectly rational, and as a result they misperceive the risk of unilateral modifications.‖); 
Horton supra, note 12 at 648 (―[There] is growing acceptance that bounded rationality prevents 
even informed adherents from making welfare-maximizing choices.‖). 
13 See Horton supra, note 12 at 645-648 (attributing inefficiency in consumer‘s decisions to 
the failure to read the terms at issue, unreasonable optimism, and irrationality). 
14 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 647 (2010) ; Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract 
Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 13-21 (2009); Ronald J. Mann and Travis Siebeneicher, Just One 
Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 998-1001 (2008). 
15 See, e.g., Robert Hillman and Maureen O‘Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 106-108 (2011). 
16 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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Article not only demonstrates that the intuition has bite across an array of 
precautionary decisions, but that it cannot be explained by straightforward 
analysis of economic costs and benefits, even when we take into account 
transactions costs. We proceed as follows. In Part 1 of this Article, we argue 
that the extant literature on self-protective behavior by contracting parties, 
loosely organized around the term ―precautions‖ ignores the psychological 
dimensions of self-protection in contract, and we suggest that existing 
behavioral evidence helps explain why contract formation might affect 
precautions. 
In Part 2, we present the results of three questionnaire studies in which 
respondents indicate that they would be more likely to protect their own 
interests—via a liquidated damages clause, warranty, or shopping around—
when the contract is under negotiation than they would when they understand 
the agreement to be finalized. Our goal in this experimental series is to control 
for economic justifications for Judge Posner‘s intuition, including transaction 
costs and the anticipated legal remedies that parties might obtain in contracts 
(rather than in negotiations). We are left with a decrease in precautionary 
behavior contingent on the promisee‘s belief that a contract has been formed, 
a phenomenon which cannot be easily explained by the economic incentives.  
In Part 3, we draw lessons from existing psychology and experimental 
economics research and consider their applications to the contracts context. 
Research on prospect theory, particularly on loss aversion and the status quo 
bias, may help explain why parties might be willing to expend resources before 
the contract is signed, but be reluctant to incur what they perceive as an 
additional loss once the deal is done. We also consider the possibility, 
bolstered by research on cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias, that 
people implicitly or explicitly subscribe to a behavioral rule of thumb that 
favors wariness in the selection phase of contract and trust in the execution 
phase. Finally, in Part 4, we lay out some of the real world applications of our 
findings, and discuss the limitations of our work. 
1. Self-Interest and Precaution 
 
1.1 Defining Precautions 
This Article is about how and when parties, promisees in particular, take 
precautions in contract. As a general matter, when we think about contract 
precautions, the examples that come easily to mind are the protections against 
breach by commercial actors. Developers purchase insurance against 
construction delays; companies monitor workers to guard against shirking; 
retailers can source goods from multiple manufacturers to reduce the harm of 
9-Feb-12] Psychology of Precautions 6 
any one problem in the supply chain. 17 These examples lend themselves nicely 
to economic or game theoretic analyses of optimal precaution-taking,18 but 
they give the false impression that precautions are only relevant for a small 
fraction of contracts.  
Ordinary consumers make many choices about investing in precautions. 
Precautions can be general or specific. Health and homeowners insurance 
remediate injuries (including ones generated by breach) that the law may 
undercompensate; customers purchase shipping insurance to supplement the 
declared value of their packages.19 Typically, however, formal insurance against 
breach is relatively expensive for the promisee to purchase, in part because it is 
so difficult to monitor the promisor‘s behavior.20 There is also evidence that 
individuals typically are underinsured against catastrophic breaches, in part 
because of the kinds of decision biases that we explore later in this paper.21 
Promisees can also take precautions that are internal to the contractual 
relationship. Before contracting, they can select against the likelihood of 
breach using various methods: third-party providers, social connections, 
evidence of brand strength, or face-to-face signals of trustworthiness.22 When 
they perceive their counterparties to be less trustworthy, they may pay less for 
performance.23 Or promisees can ask for contractual terms that will reduce the 
likelihood of breach, the harm that it will cause, or will increase the damages 
                                                 
17 See David Campbell, A Relational Critique of the Third Restatement of Restitution § 39, 68 
WLLR 1063, 1112 (2011) (explaining that a potential plaintiff may wish to minimize the risk of 
loss from breach by obtaining additional insurance or contracting with multiple suppliers). But 
see  Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1381, 1385 
(2009) (―[T]he promisee is an imperfect monitor and is unlikely to detect the monitor‘s lack of 
precaution.‖). 
18 See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 
Tul. L. Rev. 1109, 1158 (2006) (arguing that default rules could be mapped onto efficient 
precautions parties take during negotiations). 
19 See, e.g., http://www.shipsurance.com/shipping_insurance.asp 
20 Steve Thel and Peter Siegelman, You Do Have To Keep Your Promises: A Disgorgement 
Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1181, 1231 (2011).  Impracticability is often 
cited as an example of the interplay between promisee‘s insurance (or lack of it) and the 
promisor‘s discharge.  Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related 
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 92 (1977) 
21 Howard Kunreuther, Robert Meyer and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Overcoming Decision 
Biases to Reduce Losses from Natural Catastrophes, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY (E. 
Shafir (ed.), Princeton University Press, in press, 2012). 
22 See, e.g., Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, UCLA L. 
Rev. 1193, 1219 (1994) (explaining that manufacturers heavily invest in branding in order to 
create a positive reputation on which consumers will rely). 
23 But see Campbell supra, note 20 at 1112 (―Now, if the risk of idiosyncratic loss is high, 
the potential plaintiff may pay the higher price for the [good for which the party is 
contracting], because the extra security, and ultimately the extra precaution, will be of value to 
him.‖). 
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that the law permits.24 Alternatively, they may invest less in reliance on the 
contract.25 
Later in this Article, we will suggest that promisees might take precautions 
against counterparty actions that don't rise to the level of legal breach.  Before 
doing so, we first ask how legal economists have approached the problem of 
guarding oneself against actions that the law also remedies. 
1.2 Why Not Take Precautions: The Economic Explanation 
Most discussions of precautions ask when self-protection against breach is 
economically justified. The literature on optimal precautions in the law and 
economics tradition is well-developed,26 noted for its sophistication but 
criticized for its indeterminacy.27 It generally focuses on the complex 
relationship between the default rule of damages (reliance or expectation) and 
how much the parties will invest in the bargain after it has been made.28 The 
idea is that people will take precautions if they think that they will be 
undercompensated in the event of breach. Authors usually assume risk 
neutrality, perfect information, rational parties, and fully compensatory damage 
regimes.29 Under these assumptions, we may general expect that parties will 
invest in precautions in ways that do not maximize their joint welfare.  In 
particular, we expect moral hazard.  
                                                 
24 Cf. FedEx Express Terms and Conditions; FedEx Ground Tariff, available at 
http://www.fedex.com/us/service-guide/terms/express-ground/index.html ("The declared 
value of any package represents our maximum liability in connection with a shipment of that 
package, including, but not limited to, any loss, damage, delay, misdelivery, nondelivery, 
misinformation, any failure to provide information, or misdelivery of information relating to 
the shipment. It is the shipper‘s responsibility to prove actual damages. Exposure to and risk 
of any loss in excess of the declared value is assumed by the shipper. You may transfer this 
risk to an insurance carrier of your choice through the purchase of an insurance policy. 
Contact an insurance agent or broker if you desire insurance coverage. WE DO NOT 
PROVIDE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF ANY KIND.") 
25 See Francesco Parisi et al., Optimal Remedies for Bilateral Contracts, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 
249 (2011) (explaining that in some bilateral contracts parties who do not trust that the other 
contracting party will perform have an incentive to withhold performance rather than invest in 
the contract). 
26 For a useful summary, see Richard Craswell, The “Incomplete Contracts” Literature and 
Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151, 159 (2005).  
27 For a classic statement of the indeterminacy position, see Eric A. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 836-39(2003). 
28 Typically in the literature, authors focus take promisors‘ precautions to be investments 
to avoid breach, while the promisee‘s precautions are the amount that it relies on the bargain.  
George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80  VA . L . REV. 1225, 1235 (1994) 
29 Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 469-70 
(1980). 
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Both the expectation and the reliance measures of damage may cause the 
promisee who anticipates breach to rely too much and take too few 
precautions.30 That is, because the promisee is in effect insured against losses 
by contract damages, she will overinvest in her own performance and turn an 
efficient bargain into one the promisor would not have originally entered into. 
Conversely, the promisor may spend less to prevent breach than is otherwise 
optimal.31 Thus, if parties are unable to modify the default regime, damage 
remedies inevitably will cause one of the parties to behave inefficiently. 
This relationship between precautions and damages has particularly stark 
implications for pre-contractual reliance.32 Generally, given that contract 
doctrine purportedly rarely compensates pre-contract reliance,33 parties will be 
motivated to invest less in pre-contract investigation than they otherwise 
would. Thus, scholars argue that the law encourages moral hazard and 
opportunism by promisors.34 In this vein, Richard Craswell has argued that 
selection is an important pre-contractual precaution; the promisee might select 
away from risky promisors as a form of prevention against breach.35 Where 
buyers and sellers are perfectly informed, of course, the law‘s remedies will not 
influence such selection decisions.36 However, where the promisee is 
imperfectly aware of the risk of the promisor‘s breach – as will almost always 
be the case – the situation is more complex. As such imperfectly informed 
promisees bear more risk of breach, they will be more risk averse and will buy 
more expensive precautions (so long as they are aware of their lack of 
knowledge); conversely their counterparties will be more risk seeking.37 The 
consensus is that these insights about the relationship between doctrine and 
                                                 
30 Id. at 471. 
31 Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 12-13 (1985) (describing effect). 
32 The literature is helpfully summarized and critiqued by Ofer Grosskopf & Barak 
Medina, Regulating Contract Formation: Precontractual Reliance, Sunk Costs, and Market Structure, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1977, 1992-95 (2007).  Two classic papers are Richard Craswell, Precontractual 
Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 402 (1988) (addressing the 
effect of various damage measures on the parties‘ incentives to gather information prior to 
contracting) and Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 423, 424 (2001) 
33 But cf. Anglia v. Reed, 3 All E.R. 690 (Court of Appeal, 1971). 
34 Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default 
Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 635-41 (1993); Richard Shell, 
Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 221, 227, 251-64 (1991). 
35 Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988). 
36 Id. at 653-56. 
37 Id. at 659-661; Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation, 40 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1135, 1163-65 (2003) (discussing both selection and risk investigation as a form of 
precaution). 
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efficiency ought to lead to changes in the former to encourage promisee-
precaution taking,38 such as, for example, a more rigorous disclosure regime.39  
The account that we offer here does is not necessarily in tension with the 
economic literature, because our focus is on a phenomenon that the economic 
account ignores altogether. We suggest that individuals approach the same 
self-protective decision—for example, buying a warranty—differently 
depending on whether they perceive the main contract to have been formed or 
not. The warranty itself is a precaution that only takes effect once the contract 
has been made, which means that the decision in either case assumes a world 
in which the contract exists. The reference point, then, is about when parties 
are making that precautions decision, before or after the core deal is made. 
That is, we are not asking subjects to distinguish between precautions which 
will be treated differently by the law.  In fact, we readily agree that the 
availability of remedies affects how promisees will act, but we are arguing that 
even holding remedies constant, individuals are more protective when they are 
negotiating than they are within the contract. 
1.3 Why Not Take Precautions: The Psychological Explanation 
Sometimes precautions are costly because they take a toll on the contract 
relationship. Asking for a liquidated damages clause communicates concern 
about breach, on the one hand, and a willingness to put a price on breach (thus 
perhaps destigmatizing it), on the other.40 Monitoring one‘s counterparty 
communicates distrust. Not only is this potentially an uncomfortable thing for 
the monitoring party to do, it often has the result of decreasing the monitored 
party‘s efforts.41 Parties subject to monitoring often report that the restriction 
on freedom and the sense of distrust instantiate an essentially spiteful 
response—the lack of trust is aggravating enough that they respond by 
behaving in an untrustworthy manner.42  
Indeed, the social and psychological pressures against precaution-taking 
have already been studied in the context of conflict-of-interest disclosures. 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis For 
Contractual Liability, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1829, 1851-52 (2004) ("the no-retraction regime 
improves the parties‘ incentives to make precontractual investments".); cf. Cohen, supra n. 28, 
at 1251-55 (discussing how courts might infuse promisee‘s fault into doctrine as a way of 
setting optimal precautions). 
39 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L REV. 1645, 1647 (2003); cf.  
40 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 
108 MICH L. REV. 633, 637 (2010) 
41 Bruno S. Frey, Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty, 31 
ECON. INQUIRY 663 (1993). 
42 Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1611 
(2006). 
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When one party in a transaction reveals that she has a conflict of interest, how 
does it affect the other party‘s choices? Daylian Cain and George Loewenstein 
found that the disclosure of conflicts leads to exaggeration by advisors and 
little discounting by advisees.43 In fact, some advisees appear to trust a 
discloser even more, reasoning that the disclosure itself is evidence of 
trustworthiness.44 Even when advisees do not actually feel greater trust toward 
a discloser, there is some evidence that advice recipients feel increased pressure 
to comply with advice that is accompanied by a disclosure because they feel 
―insinuation anxiety.‖45 The idea is that when one receives advice, and then a 
sheepish disclosure of a conflict along with reassurance that the underlying 
belief in the advice is true, the advisee is put in an odd position. Rejection of 
the recommendation may convey to the advisor that the advisee is suspicious 
of his motives or worries that he has been corrupted.46 Or, even more 
basically, advisees may feel obligated to help the advisor out—choosing against 
the advisor‘s interest may feel rude.47 Couched in the terms of this Article, this 
means that advisees fail to protect themselves when they are worried that 
doing so is offensive. The analogy to the contracts context puts promisees in 
the advisee position. Taking precautions against a promisor may be 
uncomfortable or even counter-productive, because doing so communicates a 
lack of trust. 
1.4 Contract as Reference Point 
In this paper, we accept both the economic and the interpersonal costs of 
precaution-taking, but suggest that the timing of the precaution-taking 
opportunity (before or after formation) affects decision-making even holding 
these costs constant. The idea that contract formation is a reference point for 
judgment is one that has had some traction in other areas of contract 
scholarship. Daniel Kahneman and his co-authors argued that to evaluate the 
fairness of a set of contract terms (described not as a contract but as ―actions 
in which a firm sets the terms of future exchanges‖), individuals look to the 
                                                 
43 Daylian Cain, George Loewenstein & Don Moore The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse 
Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest 34 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2005); Daylian Cain, George 
Loewenstein & Don Moore, When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of 
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 37 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 836 (2011). 
44 See Daylian Cain, George Loewenstein & Don Moore The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse 
Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest 34 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 5-6 (2005) (―Indeed, it is even possible 
that disclosure could sometimes increase rather than decrease trust, especially if the person 
with the conflict of interest is the one who issues the disclosure.‖). 
45 Sunita Sah, George Loewenstein, and Daylian Cain. The Burden of Disclosure: Increased 
Compliance with Disinterested Advice, Working Paper, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1615025 (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). 
46 See id. at 6 (―Under these circumstances, disclosure effectively puts the advisees in a 
bind; they distrust the advice but also feel pressured to comply with it.‖). 
47 Id. 
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reference transaction -- any exchange that sets a salient precedent for the one 
being assessed. 48 This has important implications for what kinds of contractual 
behavior people find acceptable. Kahneman and others found, for example, 
that individuals deem lowering employee wages in the face of increased labor 
supply unfair, since the employee‘s current wage serves as the reference 
transaction against which wage adjustments are measured.49 But individuals 
perceive hiring new employees at a lower wage as largely unproblematic, 
because those employees are not party to the reference transaction between 
the old employees and the firm.50 The idea of the reference transaction is that 
the contract terms become a reference point that in turn frames parties‘ 
perceptions of their obligations and vulnerabilities in an exchange.51  
Oliver Hart and John Moore recently applied this observation to contracts 
even more explicitly, arguing that contracts are reference points which define 
how parties evaluate outcomes.52 In a set of behavioral experiments, Ernst 
Fehr, Oliver Hart, and Christian Zehnder found that contracts that build in an 
otherwise efficient level of flexibility may have the effect of disappointing 
expectations and overall reducing profits.53 Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder allowed 
players in an experimental game to choose either a flexible contract or a rigid 
contract.54 Players did not know what the state of the world would be at the 
time of trading—that is, they did not know what the market value of the 
traded good would be.55 The flexible contract permitted many different 
outcomes, based on the buyer‘s choice once she learned the market rate.56 The 
rigid contract permitted a single outcome, also determined by the buyer, 
decided at the moment of drafting.57  
Sellers had the option of ―shading,‖ or paying a small amount to reduce 
the buyer‘s profit.58  We can think of this as the seller‘s opportunity to punish 
the buyer for bad behavior. Sellers who got very little of the joint surplus when 
                                                 
48 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729 (1986). 
49 Id. at 729-730. 
50 See id. at 730 (―For new transactions, prevailing competitive prices or wages provide the 
natural reference.‖). 
51 Id. at 729. 
52 Fehr, Hart, & Zehnder, supra note 6. 
53 See id. at 4 (―A flexible contract as the advantage that parties can adjust the outcome to 
the state of the world, but the disadvantage that any outcome selected will typically cause at 
least one party to feel aggrieved and shortchanged, which leads to a loss of surplus from 
shading.‖). 
54 Id. at 6. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 10-11. 
57 Fehr, Hart, & Zehnder, supra note 9 at 10-11. 
58 Id. at 9. 
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the contract was rigid very rarely engaged in shading.59 Sellers who got the 
same kind of deal when the contract was flexible were significantly more likely 
to shade (another way of saying that they engaged in a form of costly 
punishment).60 Notice that sellers did not punish buyers for offering the 
original bad deal; they only punished buyers for the bad deal when the contract 
appeared to allow for a good deal. The reference point was the contract, 
meaning the value of performance was judged with reference not to the overall 
outcome, but with reference to the expected outcome under the contract.61  
2. Experimental Evidence of Precautions  
The studies reported below draw on each of the literatures reviewed in 
Part 1. In line with the reference point theory, we predict that people will treat 
precaution-taking decisions differently when they are in a contract already 
rather than when they are still negotiating. In real life, one reason for this may 
be drawn from the social psychology literature: people are less willing to be 
self-interested within the context of the contract relationship, because they do 
not want to offend the other party.62 Here, the scenarios we use are designed 
to exclude actual costs that might come from relational harms caused by the 
precautions. Furthermore, we predict that parties will evaluate both the 
psychological and the financial appeal of precautions in light of the existence, 
or not, of the contract.  
In this section, we investigate the hypothesis that the perceived costs of 
precautions are evaluated differently based on whether parties are in pre-
contractual negotiations or parties are in a contractual commitment.  
2.1 Study 1 
 
2.1.1 Method 
This experiment tested the hypothesis that subjects would be more likely 
to request a liquidated damages clause, a fairly common form of the 
contractual precaution,63 in the negotiation phase of contracting rather than 
after the contract had been signed. We showed subjects one of two versions of 
a contract scenario. In one version, they were asked to imagine that they were 
                                                 
59 Id. at 11-12. 
60 Id. at 17. 
61 Fehr, Hart, & Zehnder, supra note 9 at 1-3; see also Teichman, Feldman and Schurr, supra 
note 6 (finding similar results in experiments focusing on parties' interpretation of their 
contractual commitment). 
62 See supra, note 49. 
63 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 356, Comment a (1981) (explaining that a 
liquidated damages clause can save parties time and money in the event of breach). 
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still in the drafting stage; in the other, they had already signed the contract but 
could add a rider to the contract. In each case, subjects are told that the basic 
contract has already been worked out, and that they have received new 
information that might encourage them to get additional guarantees. The only 
difference between the scenarios is whether the basic exchange has been 
formalized in a signed contract or not. Here is the first Study: 
You need to hire help to move you out of your home. You approach Pack-n-Go 
Corporation, a moving firm. The cost of the Pack-n-Go Total Moving Package is $3,000. 
Two experienced movers and one trainee will be assigned to your job. Based on your 
research, Pack-n-Go‘s prices are very competitive for the kind of move you are 
contemplating.  
Contract No-Contract 
After you have signed the contract, you start 
to get some of your bigger items appraised. 
This includes an old grand piano. You 
thought the piano was worth $1,000 or so, 
but it turns out it is worth almost $4,000. You 
are somewhat worried about damage during 
the move.  
How likely would you be to call the company 
to negotiate for extra protection for the 
piano? One option is to ask the moving 
company to include a rider, a modification, to 
your contract laying out the amount that the 
movers will pay in the event of damage. How 
likely are you to ask for this kind of clause to 
be added to the agreement? 
As you begin to negotiate the moving 
contract, you start to get some of your bigger 
items appraised. This includes an old grand 
piano. You thought the piano was worth 
$1,000 or so, but it turns out it is worth 
almost $4,000. You are somewhat worried 
about damage during the move.  
During the contract negotiations, how likely 
would you be to negotiate for extra 
protection for the piano? One option is to 
ask the moving company to include a specific 
provision in the contract laying out the 
amount that the movers will pay in the event 
of damage. How likely are you to ask for this 
kind of clause during the negotiation? 
2.1.2 Results 
Subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. They were paid $.70 
for answering a 5-minute survey. There were 209 subjects in the Contract 
condition, and 201 in the No Contract condition. 60.1% of subjects were 
female. Subject ages ranged from 18 to 88, with a median age of 29.  
The hypothesis was that subjects would report that they were more willing 
to ask for a liquidated damages clause in the No Contract condition than in the 
Contract condition, and that prediction was reflected in the results. The 
average interest in the clause in the no-contract group was 5.52 on a 7-point 
scale where 7 was very likely; the mean for the Contract group was 5.00. This 
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difference is highly significant (W=16864.5, p=.0004).64 Because it can be hard 
to interpret the magnitude of the effect by looking only at the mean difference, 
we also compared the subjects‘ interest in the clause in terms of percentages—
e.g., what proportion of subjects in each group thought they would be likely to 
ask for the liquidated damages clause? We compared how many subjects said 
that they would be likely to ask for the clause (a rating of 5, 6, or 7) or would 
definitely ask for the clause by condition. 79% of subjects said they would be 
likely to ask for the clause in the No Contract condition vs. 67% in the 
Contract condition (W=18664, p=.011). Similarly, 25% of the No Contract 
subjects reported that they would ―definitely‖ ask for a liquidated damages 
clause, but only 19% said the same in the Contract condition (W=19385.5, 
p=.062).  
This study found support for the basic proposition that subjects were 
more open to the idea of requesting a liquidated damages clause when the 
contract was not yet finalized. The goal of these studies is to test the 
hypothesis that people change their stance away from precaution-taking when 
they enter a contract, even when there is no efficiency rationale for such a 
behavioral shift. This initial study offers some preliminary evidence in support 
of the hypothesis, but there are alternative explanations for the pattern of 
responses which we would like to rule out in subsequent studies. We flag three 
possibilities:  
 First, subjects may believe that the moving company would be more 
willing to add the liquidated damages clause during the negotiation than 
after, which could mean that the clause would be less costly if added 
during negotiations (though the scenario was written to suggest that the 
contract price is set), or simply that the other party would be more likely to 
refuse the request.65  
 Second, it is conceivable that subjects could imagine that it is more costly 
                                                 
64 Non-parametric tests of statistical significance like the one used here (the Wilcoxon 
test) are common when sample sizes are small, and when the distribution is non-normal. The 
tests are typically less powerful but more robust than parametric tests like the t or F statistics. 
One study reported here uses a small sample. For consistency, we report the p-values 
generated by the non-parametric test in all three studies, noting that this is the more 
conservative estimate of significance. See, e.g., ROBERT ROSENTHAL AND RALPH L. ROSNOW, 
ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 403 (McGraw Hill, 2006). 
65 Subjects may even think that adding a rider is impermissible. Larry Cunningham has 
noted that one of the most prevalent misconceptions about contracts is that they cannot be 
modified. See Lawrence Cunningham, ―Popular Misconceptions About Contracts,‖ (July 22, 
2011) available at http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/07/popular-
misconceptions-about-contracts.html (summarizing the content of his forthcoming book, 
CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY 
MATTER (set for release in March 2012), and correcting the misconception that ―[c]ontracts 
can‘t be changed once they are made‖). 
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to get a rider to a contract than to negotiate the clause upfront—perhaps 
because it means getting lawyers back in a room together or undergoing 
some kind of additional formalization of the new term.66 The scenario is 
not written to suggest that lawyers will be involved, or that the contract is 
formal enough that adding the rider would require substantial extra effort, 
but this reading is not implausible.  
 Finally, subjects may imagine that raising the precaution issue later in the 
contract relationship is more offensive to the moving company, and that, 
as such, they are more likely to shirk or retaliate in ways that could not be 
adequately monitored or fully compensated.  
Studies 2 and 3 were written to minimize the relevance of these 
explanations for the proffered result by reimagining the role of precaution-
taking in the promisor-promisee relationship. The kinds of precautions that 
come to mind most readily are those that are made known to the promisor and 
perhaps even affect his rights and obligations under the contract (like a 
liquidated damages clause or a warranty clause in the contract), or at least the 
logistics of performance. But many precautions need not affect the promisor 
at all. A promisee might discreetly monitor a construction site when the crew 
is gone for the night.  They might discreetly leave a ―nanny-cam‖ on, to watch 
a babysitter perform.  Or take a contract home to read its terms carefully. 
These are all self-protective maneuvers that happen outside the promisor‘s 
awareness. Studies 2 and 3 invoke precautionary decisions that occur outside 
the contract dealings, and are thus less likely to impose real costs, whether in 
the transactions costs or the costs of dealing with an offended counterparty.  
2.2 Study 2 
 
2.2.1 Method 
In Study 2, our hypothesis is that subjects will be more likely to buy a 
warranty before purchase than after purchase (―purchase‖ here being the 
moment of contractual agreement). This study was also conducted using 
Amazon Turk participants, using the same subject pool as that in Study 1. 
Subjects were shown one of two versions of an eBay transaction, and asked to 
report whether they would be inclined to purchase an extra warranty, and how 
much they would be willing to pay for it. In this case, the warranty is being 
offered by a third party, such that subjects do not infer that the warranty offer 
is a signal by the seller. Subjects in each condition were given identical 
                                                 
66 See Kevin E. Davis, The Demand for Immutable Contracts: Another Look at the Law and 
Economics of Contract Modifications, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 487, 496 (2006) (suggesting that one 
problem with creating incentives for renegotiation is that renegotiating incurs additional costs 
while ―redistribut[ing], rather than creat[ing], value‖). 
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information about the hypothetical seller. Finally, in the two conditions, 
subjects are meant to understand that the underlying deal is a fait accompli. In 
the Contract case, payment has already been submitted. In the other, subjects 
are told that they have already made up their minds to buy the car, but that 
payment has not been submitted. As in Study 1, the scenarios are designed to 
make clear to subjects that in both cases, the underlying deal is going through 
at a price that has already been set, and that the precaution is an add-on. In 
this case, the add-on does not actually affect the contract, in the sense that it is 
a separate deal with a third party. The scenario read as follows: 
Please imagine that you are in the market to purchase a particular make and model of 
used car: a 2003 Volkswagen Beetle, preferably in blue. Kelley Blue Book value of this car 
in excellent condition is $8,900. You scour the local newspapers and online listings. You 
have seen the car you want in a local lot for $11,000, but you think that is quite high. You 
find one in ―excellent condition‖ (per the seller‘s report) on eBay. Here is what you know 
about this seller: 
 This seller has a positive feedback score of 96.9%, with 132 ratings. 
 The seller has a 4.5 rating for ―Communication‖ and ―Shipping time‖ and a 4.3 rating 
for ―Item as described.‖ 
 The seller sells a variety of used goods; this seller is not primarily a car dealer 
 The most recent 3 comments in the ―Latest Feedback‖ screen for this seller are 
―Perfect. Thanks!!!‖; ―Good price with free shipping‖; and ―Solid B+ seller.‖ 
The conditions provided: 
Contract No-Contract 
You can buy the car now for $8,700. This 
price seems reasonable to you, and you 
decide to purchase the car. You sign the basic 
agreement of sale, and arrange for delivery. 
When you have submitted your payment, you 
get an email from eBay about an eBay 
insurance product. EBay sells a warranty that 
you can purchase from them separately, up 
until the day before delivery of the product. 
The price varies depending on the product, 
but the idea is that eBay will warranty the 
product, guaranteeing you a full refund, no 
questions asked, if you are unhappy upon 
delivery. (The normal policy is that contested 
returns go through an eBay dispute resolution 
procedure.) 
The seller has seemed reasonable so far, and 
you have submitted payment for the car, but 
you still have the choice to buy the warranty. 
You can buy the car now for $8,700. This 
price seems reasonable to you. You start 
emailing with the seller to see if you can agree 
on the details and arrange a sale. 
While you are still working things out with 
the seller and the sale is not final, you are 
made aware of an eBay insurance product. 
EBay sells a warranty that you can purchase 
from them when you submit payment to the 
seller. The price varies depending on the 
product, but the idea is that eBay will 
warranty the product, guaranteeing you a full 
refund, no questions asked, if you are 
unhappy upon delivery. (The normal policy is 
that contested returns go through an eBay 
dispute resolution procedure.)  
The seller seems reasonable so far, and you 
have already made up your mind to buy the 
car, but the sale is not final. 
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In both the contract and the non-contract condition, buyers were then asked: 
What is the likelihood that you would purchase the eBay warranty if it were priced at 
$150?  
What is the most you would pay for the eBay warranty at this point? (In dollars) 
 
2.2.2 Results 
In this case, the hypothesis was that subjects would report more interest in 
the warranty, and a willingness to pay a higher price for it, in the No Contract 
condition. Both predictions were borne out by the data. Subjects in the 
Contract group reported a mean likelihood to purchase a warranty of 5.35 on a 
seven-point scale, compared to a mean of 5.67 in the No Contract group 
(W=18504.5, p=.030). As in Study 1, we also parsed this data by looking at the 
increased proportion of subjects reporting that they would either likely or 
definitely purchase the warranty. In this case, 34% of subjects in the Contract 
group and 44% of subjects in the No Contract group said they would 
definitely buy the warranty (W=18839.5, p=.033). A similar trend, though not 
significant, emerges by comparing whether subjects are likely (a rating of 5 to 
7) to buy the warranty or not: 77% are likely in the Contract condition, and 
82.5% are likely in the No Contract condition (W=19838, p=.162). 
The willingness to pay question also differed significantly. Subjects in the 
Contract group were willing to pay $175.53 on average for the warranty, but 
subjects in the No Contract group would pay up to an average of $196.07. 
This is also a statistically significant difference, one-tailed (W=18885, p=.015).  
Overall, subjects found the warranty more attractive before they had 
finalized the deal than after, even reporting that they would pay more for it ex 
ante than ex post. In Study 1, a number of mechanisms were posited for why 
parties might be more willing to request a liquidated damages clause during 
negotiations rather than after. Here, many of those explanations are 
inapplicable, because the main transaction is separate from the warranty 
purchase. The price of the warranty is not different across conditions, nor is it 
more or less of a hassle to purchase. And, since the warranty seller is not the 
car seller, the warranty can be purchased without any signals about the primary 
contract.  
However, these results are plausibly subject to one additional alternative 
explanation that is particularly hard to eliminate in the contract context. The 
issue is this: subjects who read that they have signed the contract may believe 
that they only would have signed the contract if they were very confident 
about the other party‘s likelihood to perform. Although there is no content to 
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the contract descriptions to support this inference, it tracks real-world 
experience. We trust people we are in contracts with more than those we 
aren‘t, believing we chose our contracts counterparties precisely because we found 
them trustworthy. Study 3 is designed to make the moment of contracting appear 
essentially arbitrary. 
2.3 Study 3 
 
2.3.1 Method 
This study tested subjects‘ sensitivity to the isolated fact of being party to a 
contract on the decision to ―shop around‖ for better terms. One of the goals 
of this study was to narrow the distinction between Contract and No Contract 
until it was no longer plausibly relevant to precautions decisions. Subjects in 
the Contract group read that their car purchase contract could be cancelled, 
with no penalty, within three days of purchase. Subjects in the No Contract 
group read that their contract had been signed, but would not go into effect 
for three days, and they could opt out until then. This description was 
intended to make the notion of contract as meaningless as possible. Thus, in 
both cases, doing nothing leads to contract, and returning the car within three 
days of purchase cancels the contract and has no other legal repercussions. 
Thirty female and thirty-one male incoming Temple law students 
responded to a voluntary ten minute questionnaire about contracts. They were 
not compensated. Subjects were randomly assigned to see all items in the 
Contract or No Contract condition. The scenario read as follows: 
Please imagine that you are in the market to lease a new car, a Chevy Blazer. You find the 
car you want for the reasonable price of $300 per month at Tim‘s Auto World.  
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Contract Non-Contract 
You go to the dealership and sign the standard 
lease contract, which includes a three-day return 
clause—if you don‘t want the car, you can return 
it, no questions asked, during the first three days. 
In other words, your lease is under contract, but 
you have three days to cancel with no legal or 
financial consequences. You take the car home. 
Remember: You are under a contract, but you 
can walk away without consequence. 
 
On your second day with the new car, you see an 
ad in the paper from Discount Car Universe: 
―Chevy Blazers Leased at Deep Discount!‖ with 
a number to call for more information. 
You go to the dealership and Tim tells you that 
you can take the car home and use it for three 
days. If you like it, you just keep it, and the 
standard contract goes into effect. In other 
words, your lease is not under contract, but the 
standard lease agreement will kick in in three 
days if you do not bring the car back. You take 
the car home. 
Remember: You are not under contract. 
On your second day with the new car, you see 
an ad in the paper from Discount Car Universe: 
―Chevy Blazers Leased at Deep Discount!‖ 
with a number to call for more information. 
We included three dependent variables. Wording of the questions did not 
differ across conditions. Likelihood questions were answered on a Likert scale 
where 1 was ―very unlikely,‖ 4 was ―neutral,‖ and 7 was ―very likely.‖ 
1. What is the likelihood you would call Discount Car Universe?  
2. Now please imagine that newspaper ad lists the lease price for the same make and 
model of the car you have from Tim‘s. They are leasing the same new Chevy Blazer 
that you have for $265/month. What is the likelihood that you would decide to 
return the car you have to Tim‘s and go with the Discount Car Universe option? 
3. Imagine that they have the same new Chevy Blazer. What is the highest 
monthly rate at which you would decide to return the car you have to Tim‘s and go 
with the Discount Car Universe option? 
2.3.2 Results 
Data from sixty total subjects was analyzed; twenty-nine in the Contract 
condition and thirty-one in the No-Contract condition. One subject was 
omitted from the analysis for failure to follow instructions.  
 Contract No Contract 
Call to learn 
discount 
5.34 6.03 
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Return for $35 
savings 
5.52* 6.13* 




The Call variable is not significant by itself (W=385.5, p=.323), but both 
Return (W=290.5, p=.014) and Price (W=282.5, p=.013) differ significantly 
across conditions. The Call and Return variables were also combined to test 
the overall willingness to shop around. The total shop around ―score‖ is 
significantly different between groups (W=310.5, p=.0368). 
These results suggest that the Contract/No Contract effect persists even 
when the Contract/No Contract distinction is unrelated to selection. We 
discuss the implications of this series of experiments below. 
3. Implications for the Psychology of Contract 
Taken together, these studies provide evidence that across a range of 
precaution types, people report that they would be less willing to protect their 
interests vis à vis a contractual counterparty once in a contract. They are less 
willing to include a liquidated damages clause, less willing to purchase a 
warranty, and less willing to investigate other options when they are already 
party to the contract, even when the formalization of the contract is essentially 
arbitrary and without legal consequence. 
In this part, we explore several psychological mechanisms that plausibly 
explain these results. We divide these explanations into two groupings. The 
first is a prospect theory explanation, which posits that the moment of 
contracting establishes a reference point that frames how parties value the 
costs and benefits of self-protective behavior.67 A prospect theory explanation 
focuses on the different mental accounting parties engage in when deciding 
whether to increase the contract price by adding the cost of a precaution or to 
incur a separate loss by purchasing a precaution after the contract has been 
signed.  
The second explanation is less straightforward. We draw on existing 
cognitive and behavioral psychology research to argue that the mere fact of 
being contractually bound affects parties‘ attitudes toward one another. They 
                                                 
67 See Hart & Moore supra, note 9 at 2. 
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are wary and adversarial in the pre-contract vetting. Once they have entered 
the contract, they are trusting and cooperative—even when the moment of 
formation is essentially meaningless. People may follow this algorithm because 
it is a good rule of thumb. They may also be particularly trusting in contracts 
because they are motivated to trust, as it does not feel good to be contractually 
bound to an untrustworthy counterparty.  
We note at the outset that the three studies reported above cannot 
distinguish between the explanations we are positing here. The following 
section considers both explanations, and discusses them in light of current 
controversies in contract doctrine and policy. 
3.1 Prospect Theory 
The idea of contracts as reference points is substantially motivated by the 
tenets of prospect theory, the overarching theory of experienced utility that 
explains phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect. 
Prospect theory says that people evaluate outcomes by comparing them to a 
reference point: they weigh losses more heavily than gains, and they are risk-
averse in the domain of gains but risk-seeking in the domain of losses.68 The 
reference point is the kink in the value function, the state of the world to 
which any outcome is compared. Prospect Theory suggests that people code 
the cost of vigilance in its various forms (shopping around, buying warranties, 
etc.) around reference points.69 This has several effects on how people may 
judge the value of precautions, based on how they understand the status quo 
and how they mentally bundle the costs and benefits of self-protection.70 
3.1.1 Mental Accounting 
 
Because the marginal utility of gains is declining, and the marginal disutility 
of losses is declining,71 people have preferences for how to account for 
multiple gains and losses. In short, utility is maximized when gains are 
segregated (lots of small gains are better than one big gain) and losses are 
integrated (one big loss is better than lots of small losses).72  In this same vein, 
and also relevant to our results, when people have a ―mixed gain‖—which is to 
                                                 
68 See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 
1118 (2003). 
69 See id. (explaining that people ―evaluate decision options‖ in relation to a reference 
point that represents the ―status quo‖). 
70 See id. at 1115 (suggesting that Prospect Theory allows theorists to understand how 
people evaluate whether or not to take precautions based on perceived consequences). 
71 See Alan Schwartz et al., Prospect Theory, Reference Points, and Health Decisions, 3 JUDGMENT 
AND DECISION MAKING 174, 176 fig. 1 (2008) (depicting the Prospect Theory value function). 
72 Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199 (1985). 
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say, a mixture of gains and losses that results in a net gain—they prefer 
integration to segregation.73  This is a fairly simple explanation for why we 
might see people opting to add a warranty into the contract price when they 
would never be willing to pay for the warranty if they were contacted about it 
two days after the initial product purchase. In the pre-contract case, 
purchasing the precaution means raising the contract price. In Study 2, 
subjects willing to pay $150 for the warranty pre-contract might think that they 
are going from a loss of $8700 to $8850. Once the contract is signed, the 
reference point is re-set, and the warranty means moving from a cost of $0 to 
a cost of $150. The analysis holds up if we think of the contract as a mixed 
gain.74  Because losses loom larger than gains, a smaller gain is preferable to a 
bigger gain plus a separate loss.  
 
3.1.2 Status Quo Bias 
The status quo bias describes an individual‘s preference for the current 
state of the world, even in the face of evidence that a particular change has a 
high probability of yielding net benefits.75 The status quo bias is related to the 
endowment effect: people who are endowed with a good value it more highly 
than those who are not endowed with it, even when the initial endowment is 
randomly assigned.76 Because potential losses loom larger than potential gains, 
those faced with the possibility of making a switch underestimate the utility of 
new benefits and overestimate the disutility of losing currently-valued 
attributes.77  
Favoring the status quo is often quite rational.78 Sometimes the status quo 
                                                 
73 Id. at 202. 
74 In terms of utility, contracts are almost certainly mixed gains, because typically people 
are getting something that they want more than they want the money. See David Friedman, 
LAW‘S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 18-19 
(Princeton U. Press 2001) (explaining that based on rational-choice theory, economic legal 
analysis understands the way a contracting party values a given exchanged based on her 
willingness to enter into the transaction). However, the mixed gain analysis is not necessarily a 
perfect fit here because people may not think of their own benefit in monetary terms.  
75 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 
1228-29 (2003) (defining the ―status quo bias‖). 
76 See id. at 1229 (explaining that the status quo bias leads to the ―offer-asking gap,‖ in 
which people require a higher price to sell a good than they would offer to purchase the same 
good). 
77 For classic demonstrations of how the status quo bias may in general motivate 
contracting parties to prefer preexisting form terms, see Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference 
in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1583 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608  (1998). 
78 See Korobkin, The Endowment Effect supra, note 79 at 1280 (―[T]he endowment effect 
is not obviously ―irrational‖ behavior: a preference for what one has over what one does not 
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has been well-researched and carefully chosen, invested in over time, and 
thoroughly vetted. It deserves to be favored. But the status quo bias research 
says that people favor the status quo even when none of the above apply.79 
Even if experimenters just randomly assign one option as the status quo, and 
inform participants that the ‗status quo‘ designation is random, participants are 
still more reluctant to make a different choice.80 Switching feels different than 
choosing. This is the prospect theory explanation for the results of Study 3. 
The status quo in the no-contract condition is just that—no contract, no car 
lease. Switching when that is the case is more attractive than when the car is 
under lease, even when cancellation is permitted. 
In all, the implications of prospect theory for precautions are fairly 
straightforward. Individuals deem the precaution less valuable, or more costly, 
if they have already signed the contract. This has consequences for some real-
world contracts dilemmas. For example, in the insurance context, a number of 
commentators have expressed surprise that people are willing to purchase 
extended warranties for consumer goods, goods that almost no one would 
insure under any other circumstances.81 At least in part, there is a mental 
accounting explanation for this. Before the purchase is final, when the sales 
clerk offers the warranty, the protection is rolled into the contract price. Once 
the item is purchased, though, any additional insurance is an extra loss. 
Similarly, consumers often find themselves renewing contracts that they would 
never choose all else being equal—they are biased toward the status quo. 
Prospect theory is a plausible explanation for our findings that parties take 
a different attitude toward precautions before and after finalizing a contract, 
assuming that the subjective experience of formation is the relevant reference 
transaction. First, when a costly precaution is included in the total contract 
price, the loss is coded as less severe than it is when the loss is a separate hit 
that comes after the contract price, because of the declining marginal disutility 
of losses. Second, sometimes the wise precaution for a party to take is to seek 
a different counterparty. The status quo bias predicts that people will be 
reluctant to do so if they consider the current counterparty a done deal.  
3.2 Relational Contracting and Overtrust 
                                                                                                                            
have, or for what one is accustomed to compared to the unknown, is no more troublesome 
than a preference for chocolate ice cream over vanilla.‖). 
79 See Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra, note 81 at 624 (explaining that rational-choice 
theory cannot account for the status quo bias). 
80 Id. at 626. 
81 See, e.g., Tao Chen et al., Why do Consumers Buy Extended Service Contracts?, 36 J. OF 
CONSUMER RESEARCH 611, 611 (2009) (―Although most consumer magazines and experts 
advocate consumers not buy ESCs because they provide little value, it is intriguing that the 
demand for ESCs remains high.‖). 
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Our alternate (and possibly complementary) explanation for the 
differential precautions approaches before and after contracting is that people 
take a different stance, both interpersonally and cognitively, toward a potential 
counterparty who is being vetted than toward a contract partner. Negotiating 
is adversarial, but performing is cooperative. There are two possible reasons 
for this, the first of which is deliberate and rational and the second of which is 
implicit and intuitive.  
Of course parties may reasonably believe that once the contract is signed, 
trusting is simply more efficient. Even commercial actors sometimes prefer to 
structure their business agreements informally, with an implicit or explicit 
reliance on personal moral commitments and community norms rather than 
formal legal sanctions. Stewart Macaulay brought this to light in his analysis of 
real-world contracting between Wisconsin businessmen in the 1960s, noting 
that many of them exchanged formal written contracts but ignored them.82 
David Charny followed up on this research with a systematic analysis of the 
benefits of nonlegal sanctions. Charny argued that in many cases, commercial 
actors may be rational to depend on social and psychic harms to deter promise 
breaking.83 And, as described in Part II, people may realize that there are social 
norms around interpersonal trust in contract that are not worth violating 
because they will hinder the relationship, inducing shirking or retaliation on the 
part of the counterparty.84 Which is all to say that sometimes parties 
intentionally ground their mutual obligations in promissory morality. This 
explanation is entirely sensible and quite relevant to many contracts 
relationships, but it is one that we will set to the side at this point.85 People 
may have rational preferences for trusting their counterparties in some cases, 
but we think in many cases this is neither a robust preference nor a helpful 
stance. You might want to let down your guard with your credit card company, 
but it is probably unwise to do so. 
Rather, the norm of interpersonal trust in contracts may operate in some 
cases as a rule of thumb. The rule works very well for interpersonal promises, 
works pretty well for long-term negotiated agreements (employment, for 
example), and works quite poorly for contracts of adhesion between 
consumers and firms. The idea of a rule of thumb for interpersonal trust in 
contract is related to existing research on the commonsense approach to 
                                                 
82 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55 (1963). 
83 David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 
(1990). 
84 See supra, notes 48-50. 
85 For a more in-depth look at promissory morality, see Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann 
O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L.REV. 1717, 1755-56 (2006) (discussing 
contract law's role in promoting optimal trust). 
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contract and promise. This research argues that people use the idea of promise 
in a kind of heuristic sense, assuming that their legal obligation tracks their 
understanding of the moral obligation entailed in promise.86 They assume that 
specific performance is a typical remedy, believe that willful breachers should 
be punished more harshly than unfortunate breachers, and experience the 
harm of breach as a harm of betrayal—in other words, they evaluate breach of 
contract along the same dimensions as promise-breaking.87 Our intuition is 
that for those who reflexively think about contracts in terms of ordinary 
promissory morality, the fact of being in a contractual relationship comes with 
an assumption that interpersonal trust is the appropriate norm.  
It is also possible that people are not just mindlessly adhering to a trust-in-
contract heuristic, but that they are motivated to be trusting because they would 
feel so foolish for having chosen an untrustworthy counterparty. People may 
not want to check up on a current contract partner because doing so may 
reveal that the initial assessment or choice of counterparty was flawed. 
Cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon that describes this 
tendency to reconcile discrepancies between beliefs and past choices by 
adjusting the beliefs.88 People make many decisions for reasons that are not in 
line with beliefs. In the contracts context, we might sign a credit card contract 
because the salesperson is particularly charming or aggressive or re-order a 
low-value good (say, a newspaper subscription) because we forget to opt out. 
These are not particularly compelling reasons for contracts, and may cause 
some amount of cognitive tension as the consumers hold two dissonant 
beliefs. For example: I do not like this credit card company; I am contractually 
bound to this credit card company. Cognitive dissonance theory says that 
people will often reduce that tension by changing the belief (this contract is 
desirable), since the action is already past.89  
People who have opted into a relationship or a purchase will avoid or 
misremember information that suggests they made the wrong choice. For 
                                                 
86 See generally Kevin M. Teevin, Origins and Scope of the American Moral Obligation Principle, 46 
Clev. St. L. Rev. 585 (1998) (describing the history of moral obligations in contract law from 
the eighteenth through twentieth centuries). 
87 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of 
Contract, 6 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 405, 423 (2009) 
88 See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
89 See Yuval Feldman and Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?  
100 GEO. L. J. 5, 26-27 (2011) (hypothesizing that "the process of contracting, so long as it is 
the outcome of free choice, could lead to a deeper commitment to the contracts' terms."); 
Stephanie Stern, Temporal Dynamics of Disclosure: The Example of Residential Real Estate 
Conveyancing, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 57, 86 (arguing that late disclosures in real estate contracts 
will be ignored because buyers are invested in the deal going forward); Shmuel I. Becher, 
Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 132 (2007) 
(individuals less likely to take care with terms after they have decided to enter a contract). 
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example, people who have just bought a new car are more likely to notice 
advertisements whose content supports their purchase decision.90 Even more 
interesting from our perspective is a study of mutual fund investors. Mutual 
fund investment by non-professionals is characterized by a high level of 
inertia; investors stay with poorly performing funds even when there is no 
economic justification for doing so.91 This means that many investors are faced 
with the kind of dissonance we have described above: I have chosen to stick 
with this fund for many years when I could have chosen to sell it; this fund has 
done poorly for many years.92 William Goetzmann and Nadav Peles sent 
mutual fund investors a questionnaire about the mutual funds they used and 
how the funds had performed in the past.93 Respondents explicitly reported 
that they would not continue to hold a poorly performing fund for a long 
time.94 They did not hold a belief that justified their decisions to hold what the 
authors described as ―an unusually high frequency of poorly performing 
funds.‖95 However, investors drastically overestimated the returns of funds 
they had chosen themselves.96 They selectively remembered data points that 
affirmed their choices. 
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that people engage in selective search 
for information. This is similar to the theory of confirmation bias, which 
suggests that people who are trying to evaluate a hypothesis are more likely to 
look for information that supports the hypothesis than to search for 
potentially falsifying evidence.97 People do not look for information that will 
disconfirm a belief (e.g., I have signed on with the right counterparty), and that 
in fact they do not want such information. This may explain the choice not to 
monitor and not to shop around. And, of course, the choice to purchase a 
precaution may itself be a source of tension. It means holding two dissonant 
beliefs—I have already chosen this partner; I do not trust this partner.  
3.3 Next Steps in the Psychology of Precautions 
We have begun to sketch a picture of the kink in decision-making at the 
moment of contracting, and we have reviewed literature that may help explain 
the phenomenon. However, this paper cannot distinguish between the 
                                                 
90 See Danuta Erlich, Isaiah Guttman, Peter Schonbach and Judson Mills, Post-Decision 
Exposure to Relevant Information, 54 J. AB. SOC. PYSCH. 98 (1957). 
91 See William Goetzmann & Nadav Peles, Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors, 20 
J. FIN. RESEARCH 145, 145 (1997). 
92 Id. at 147. 
93 Id. at 147-150. 
94 Id. at 148-149. 
95 Id. at 145. 
96 Goetzmann & Peles supra, note 95 at 149. 
97 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 Rev. 
Gen. Psychol. 175, 177 (1998). 
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explanations we have offered (prospect theory and overtrust), nor can we rule 
out other explanations. This is a real problem for understanding which 
contexts are most relevant to this finding. Prospect theory is a powerful 
foundation for precautions that require extra payment, or where there is a 
status quo bias at issue, but the overtrust explanation seems more compelling 
as an explanation for why consumers do not read late-arriving riders to their 
contracts. Identifying the psychological mechanism, or mechanisms, that 
explain our results is the next step in this research.  
Our argument also elides the important observation that people feel 
differently about different kinds of contracts.98 Our psychological response to 
contracts of adhesion is and should be different than the psychology of long-
term deals with well-liked business partners. Recent research suggests that 
people are held responsible for the moral commitment of contract in ways that 
corporations are not.99 And form contracts may be perceived as generally less 
fair and less enforceable than other contracts.100 Even without empirical 
support, it seems reasonable to predict that consumers signing form contracts 
with large companies will show a smaller effect of contract than those in 
agreements with other individuals. We predict that this is a moderator of the 
effect we have demonstrated, and we hope to test this prediction empirically in 
future work. 
Finally, one of the most interesting questions raised but not addressed in 
this research is the question of when people think they are in contracts. In the 
studies reported above, subjects were told in plain language that a contract 
period had or had not begun. We have speculated, though, that the moment of 
contracting may be subject to manipulation.101 Even when a court would find 
that the contract was not finalized, for example, consumers who have signed 
their name to something, or executed the primary exchange, may understand 
                                                 
98 We recognize that precautionary behavior is likely to be different depending on the kind 
of contract that parties are in. This Article is about the broad class of contracts that individual 
non-merchants might be party to, including negotiated agreements like home renovation 
contracts, and consumer contracts of adhesion like cell phone contracts. We intentionally 
exclude employment contracts, although doctrinal questions surrounding formation and 
following terms abound in that area of law.  That is, we argue that individuals generally behave 
differently whether or not the contract has begun, but we realize that the effect of contract 
may be moderated by the kind of contract. 
99 Uriel Haran, A Person-Organization Discontinuity in Contract Perception: Why Organizations 
Can Get Away With Breaking Contracts But Individuals Cannot, 
http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/HaranContractBreach.pdf. 
100 Zev Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of Law, and 
Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
101 Cf. Robert A. Hillman and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic 
Age, 77 NYU L. REV. 429, 476-482 (2002) (discussing ways in which firms could encourage 
consumers to fail to read their contracts online). 
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themselves to be in a contract.102 In fact, we might even worry that a 
salesperson may push for an oral agreement, and then present the written 
contract as an apparent afterthought.  This is precisely the scenario that makes 
policymakers especially nervous in contexts like subprime mortgage lending.103 
One of the contributions of psychological research may be to pin down the 
factors that lead consumers to consider a deal finalized.  
 
4. Discussion 
Given the basic phenomenon that emerges from the studies here, there are 
some initial points to make about the doctrinal implications of our findings. 
That the moment of contracting is special isn‘t exactly earth-shattering. 
Indeed, the first-year contracts class is built around the instant when two 
minds meet and agree to do business with one another. Our experiments 
suggest, however, that this moment produces a behavioral kink, divorced from 
concerns about cost, or projection of future legal remedies. What is the 
practical upshot of the research that we have undertaken?   
4.1 Reimagining Precautions 
This paper seeks to expand the category of precautions to include self-
interested or self-protective behavior more generally. In our view, the literature 
on ―precautions‖ focuses too narrowly on those precautions which parties may 
take after they have entered into the contract, and which protect against 
breach.  But there are many steps that ordinary consumers can take to protect 
themselves, not simply against breach of their contracts, but from exploitative 
or undesirable behavior by their counterparty. Such behaviors, which 
maximize gains from the contracting relationship, are precautionary, and we 
posit will be subject to a similar psychic calculus as the precautions against 
breach that our experiments directly targeted. 
For example, reading a contract carefully is a precaution.104 Hidden terms 
                                                 
102 See, e.g., Anthony M. Balloon, From Wax Seals to Hypertext: Electronic Signatures, Contract 
Formation, and a New Model for Consumer Protection in Internet Transactions, 50 EMORY L.J. 905, 934 
(2001)  (―That a signature is the central formality in contract formation-particularly in a 
consumer transaction cannot be overstated. Most consumers equate their signature with being 
bound to the terms of an agreement.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
103 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2043-2045 (2007) (including in its definition of 
predatory lending non-fraudulent forms of non-transparency between brokers or lenders and 
consumers). 
104 This is not, of course, a new insight.  See, e.g., Erin Ann O'Hara, Choice of Law for Internet 
Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1883, 1925 (2005) 
(exploring social and psychological forces that reduce the likelihood that consumers will 
protect themselves by reading their agreements). 
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are not always unenforceable, even if the promisee and court agree that they 
are unfairly surprising. But when a credit card company exploits a hidden term 
in the contract to raise a cardholder‘s interest rates, or deny class certification, 
it harms the cardholder in ways that the cardholder did not intend to be 
vulnerable to. Another example of a common precaution is hiring a lawyer. 
Ordinary people involved in higher-stakes deals (home purchases, for 
example) take this precaution—not only to protect against the possibility that 
the seller will breach, but to ensure that the contract itself protects the buyer‘s 
interests.105 And, of course, one of the most important ways that consumers 
protect themselves is by shopping around. Comparing terms and prices and 
selecting good deals are the primary means by which consumers can influence 
the terms of form contracts.106  
Construed broadly, precautions matter for ordinary consumers, and this 
has implications for analysis of precautions. First of all, it means that the scope 
of the issue is big: it involves almost all contracts, not just negotiated 
agreements between sophisticated players. Second, it means that economic 
analyses are less likely to accurately predict precautionary behavior, because 
ordinary citizens are more likely than commercial or institutional actors to 
deviate from the rational actor model in noticeable, systematic ways. This 
approach to defining contractual self-protection motivates the focus here. We 
ask when ordinary promisees—e.g., consumers—protect themselves against 
deficient performance, and how cognitive biases may discourage optimal 
precaution-taking even when economic analysis suggests that they ought to 
protect themselves.  
So re-imagined, the nexus of precautions (against breach and exploitation) 
and psychic costs (both prospect theory and overtrust) has certain potential 
doctrinal implications.  We must be quick to emphasize the tentativeness of 
our conclusions. Not only is our work subject to the ordinary caveats about 
survey research, which we explore at length below, but we would need to 
directly test whether in fact individuals' vigilance against breach and 
exploitation are similarly kinked. If they are, and we think there is no obvious 
theoretical reason that they would not be, we would further want to 
understand how different kinds of contracts and contracting parties moderate 
the effects we have seen. Still, there is a possibility that understanding 
contractual vigilance as a reference point problem will have certain 
transformative implications, which we now describe. 
                                                 
105 See Michael Braunstein, Structural Change and Intra-Professional Competitive Advantage: An 
Example Drawn from Residential Real Estate Conveyances, 62 MO. L. REV. 241, 241 (1997) (noting 
that lawyers were involved in 40% of residential real estate conveyances in 1997). 
106 But cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: 
The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 447 (2008) (finding little 
relationship between competition and consumer-friendly terms).  
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4.2 Easy Cases: Good Faith and Modification 
In some areas of doctrine, we think that re-emphasizing the moment of 
contracting fits well with the current approach of courts and scholars. For 
example, consider the doctrine of good faith. Loosely defined, opportunism is 
selfishness and denial of the implicit duty one owes another to behave in ways 
that are socially acceptable. As Erin O‘Hara O‘Connor observes, the anti-
opportunism good faith doctrine applies to parties in a contracting 
relationship, but not to counterparties with whom deals are not yet concluded:  
[C]ontracting parties are entitled to behave in a complete self-interested 
fashion when they are choosing contracting partners and negotiating 
contract terms. Once the relationship has been formed, however, the 
parties are expected to treat the contract as a kind of partnership – the 
relationship is supposed to benefit both parties, and performance or 
termination which deprives one of the parties of the substantial value of 
the contract is simply unacceptable.107 
Good faith thus acts as a powerful check against the impulse to take 
advantage of a counterparty.  It punishes actions which are anti-social; denies 
unreasonable or harmful exercises of contractual rights; and prohibits ―game 
playing‖ with respect to contracting terms.108 But before the moment of 
contracting, we are free to behave in exactly such socially outrageous ways. 
Indeed, checks on exploitative behavior pre-contract are weak. Though 
parties may not lie about facts, they may (generally) puff.109  Though sellers 
may not exercise undue influence, that defense is famously almost impossible to 
prove at trial.110 Duress prevents the most extreme examples of negotiation 
pressure, but the far more common situation of a party benefiting from 
another‘s economic necessity is generally perfectly legal.111 Overall, parties 
failing to take precautions against exploitative behavior pre-contract are 
unlikely to be protected by the law, while parties in a contract who are similarly 
trusting are entitled to a measure of legally-funded insurance. In this way, the 
law generally tracks our experimental findings about how laypeople perceive 
                                                 
107 Erin A. O‘Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract 17 (Gruter Inst. Project on Values & Free 
Enter., 2007); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, cmt. C. That said, there are of 
course strands of good faith doctrine written into the negotiation process.  For example, 
courts routinely will "fix" illusory contracts by implying some reasonable set of reciprocal 
obligations into the parties‘ terms.   
108 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 11.39 (2009). 
109 David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395 (2006). 
110 Kellye Y. Testy,  An Ode to Odorizzi, excerpted in RANDY BARNETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 1003 (3d ed. 2003); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational 
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (2004) (describing 
undue influence and duress as "narrow" doctrines"). 
111 PERILLO, SUPRA N.  108, at 9.7 (discussing business compulsion). 
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the importance of the moment of contracting. 
 By contrast, the modern approach to modification appears to badly match 
the behavioral effects we have shown.  Historically, the common law generally 
viewed modifications to contracts with suspicion.112 Such changes generally 
required new consideration (however slight).113 Where unforeseen 
circumstances made performance of the existing agreement unusually difficult, 
modifications which were fair and equitable could be enforceable.114 But such 
circumstances rested on an increase in the promisor‘s cost, not the availability 
of a benefit previously unanticipated.115 This treatment of modification made 
some sense from a psychological perspective. By focusing only on increase in 
the promisor‘s cost, as opposed to opportunity costs, the rule operates 
asymmetrically, ―punishing‖ breaches to gain, and ―permitting‖ breaches 
resulting from losses.116  This fits well with previous research suggesting that 
individuals feel quite differently about these two scenarios.117 
But, as we discussed in the Introduction, courts seem to be increasingly 
unwilling to police modifications to consumer agreements.118 Commentators 
bemoan the practice of imposing unilateral changes to common consumer 
contracts without providing any corresponding benefit.119 Such unilateral 
modifications are increasingly checked through viral campaigns–consider 
Verizon‘s proposed $2.00 convenience fee for online credit card payment,120 or 
Bank of America‘s $5.00 fee for debit card use.121 Both modifications were 
                                                 
112 Cf. United  States  v.  Stump  Home  Specialties  Mfg.,  905  F.2d  1117  (7th  Cir.  
1990) (arguing that modifications ought not be policed by good faith or consideration 
doctrines but rather unconscionability or duress). 
113 The UCC disposes of the need for new consideration under 2-209(1), though of course 
the Code‘s general requirement of good faith prevails.   
114 PERILLO, SUPRA N.  108, at 4.9; Rest. 2nd. 89. 
115 See, e.g., Brian Const. and Development Co., Inc. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72 (1978) 
(holding a contract modification binding where one party would have been forced to incur 
unforeseen expenses under the initial contract). 
116 See Aditi Bagchi, Managing Moral Risk: The Case of Contract, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1878, 
1924 n.148 (2011). 
117 Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron, supra n. 87. 
118 See Horton, Shadow Terms, supra note 9, at 665-666; Bar-Gill and Davis, supra note 10, at 
8-16 (providing evidence of scope of unilateral modification problem). 
119 See Katherine J. K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act’s Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality Debate, 78 
Fordham L. Rev. 641, 692-693 (2009) (explaining that many jurisdictions do not permit 
unilateral contract modification in the absence of additional consideration). 
120 ―Verizon Scraps $2.00 Fee,‖ CNN MONEY (Dec. 30, 2011), available at 
money.cnn.com/2011/12/30/technology/verizon_fee_cancelled/index.htm. 
121 Brady Dennis, ―Bank of America Faces Outrage of Debit Card Charge,‖ The 
Washington Post (Sept. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bank-of-america-faces-outrage-over-debit-card-
charge/2011/09/30/gIQAp8zGAL_story.html. 
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ultimately abandoned after substantial public pressure, not a court‘s decision.122  
   The real question is what is wrong with unilateral modifications to a 
long-term consumer contract. One possibility is that such modifications are an 
expression of inequality in bargaining power, imposed through adhesive 
contracts without the possibility of change. Without disagreeing with that 
premise, one might fairly question why modified terms ought to be treated 
differently from those originally proposed in the deal. If we are to permit 
consumers to enter into adhesion contracts with large firms with little 
substantive regulation, why not similarly permit them to continue such 
relationships as modified over time? 
Our experiments suggest that internal to the contracting relationship, 
promisees are unlikely to perceive new terms in the same adversarial light as 
they might have before the contract was formed. This is particularly relevant to 
more complex or less salient terms like arbitration clauses. We would predict 
that in the contract, parties are less likely to read them, and having read them, 
probably less likely to perceive the likelihood of opportunistic behavior by 
their counterparties.   
The precise mechanism for this effect remains unknown. Some have 
argued that status quo bias seems to provide a sufficient reason standing alone 
for parties to stand pat despite onerous proposed modifications.123  But we 
tend to think that motivated cognition and overtrusting provides a more 
powerful explanation.124 Because, as Alces and Greenfield argue, contracts 
encourage relational investments,125 consumers may be caught flat-footed by 
their counterparties‘ attempts to change the terms of the deal.  In either event, 
we agree with those commentators who suggest that courts should generally 
treat modifications with heightened scrutiny.126 
And yet, this general conclusion requires an important caveat. If a 
modification is requested by an individual and is the subject of actual 
negotiation, current doctrine‘s emphasis on a requirement of changed 
circumstances seems overprotective. After all, our research suggests that inside 
                                                 
122 See CNN Money supra, note 127 (describing the online petition that caused Verizon to 
revoke the proposed policy); Dennis supra, note 128 (noting dissatisfied customers‘ responses 
to the proposal). 
123 Eric A. Zacks, Unstacking The Deck? Contract Manipulation and Credit Card Accountability, 
78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (2010); Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, 
and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
124 Of course, these are not actually competing explanations.  See Becher, supra n. 89, at 
138-140. 
125 Alces and Greenfield, supra n. 11, at 1100. 
126 See generally Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of 
Individual Contracts, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 95 (2006) (arguing for more rigorous judicial standards 
in evaluating ―rolling‖ contracts). 
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of the relationship, precaution taking will be relatively rare. Modified bargains 
initiated by laypeople should be understood by the law to be the result of a 
special effort by one of the parties to recognize a breakdown in the 
relationship, and an attempt to assert it on sounder footing. Even if such a 
new relationship results from the increase in the opportunity cost of 
performance, an individual‘s request for a modification of an executory 
bargain should be permitted if it comports with the general obligation of good 
faith. That is, we think that Uniform Commercial Code's approach to 
modification127 can be a better fit with folk psychology than the common law‘s 
pre-existing duty rule.  
4.3 Harder Cases: Disclosure & Promissory Estoppel 
 
4.3.1 Which Terms are in the Deal? 
In modification cases, and indeed in the experiments that we present in 
this Article, the moment of contracting is not in question. Parties either have 
or have not signed on the dotted line, and that distinction affects their 
behavior. However, in at least some cases, the deal proceeds in multiple 
phases, and the moment that the law recognizes a meeting of the minds is not 
the same as the moment that a consumer believes that the contract has begun. 
For example: a seller offers to sell a computer, and a consumer buys it over the 
phone. When the consumer opens the box at home, she finds onerous terms 
in a contract included in the packaging. Will a court later include such terms in 
the parties‘ agreement? Hill v. Gateway permitted such ―rolling contracts,‖ 
reasoning that the buyer surely knows more terms are coming, and can cancel 
the contract by returning the computer.128  
Hill implicates both prospect theory and trust explanations for the 
consumers‘ apparently unwary behavior. Because the contract had already 
been ―signed‖ by both parties,129 returning the product meant a shift from the 
status quo—switching rather than choosing. And, because the contract period 
had begun, consumers who trusted the counterparty would be less likely to 
take the simplest precaution of reading the terms.  
Hill has been immensely controversial. It famously misapplied the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which would have likely thrown out the late-
arriving terms.130  But in discounting the value of pre-contract disclosure, it 
                                                 
127 See supra, note 121. 
128 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 
1996) 
129 In reality, the Hills agreed to a sale on the phone. 
130 Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F.Supp.2d 1332 (D.Kan. 2000); PERILLO, SUPRA N.  108, at 
2.12; U.C.C. 2-207 
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sparked a debate that continues to the present day.131  That debate is essentially 
about when promisees can be charged with failing to protect themselves 
against bad terms. On the one side are the drafters of the American Law 
Institute‘s new Principles of the Law of Software Contracts.132  Robert Hillman 
and Maureen O‘Rourke, authors of the Principles, defended mandatory 
disclosure before contracting against its many critics. Although acknowledging 
that mandatory disclosure of terms can create costs, and that terms are unlikely 
to be read by contracting parties, they argue that disclosure is necessary to 
preserve the legitimacy of the state-run contract enforcement regime: 
Standard forms constitute private legislation backed by the state‘s 
enforcement processes, and the legitimacy of these forms also depends 
on reasonable notice of content. In fact, adequate notice of terms 
constitutes a foundation for much of contract doctrine, including rules 
of interpretation (such as interpreting terms against the drafter), the 
parol evidence rule, and, of course, the general rules of formation.133 
Hillman and O‘Rourke also argue that disclosure can spark third-party 
monitoring, which could, in some cases, improve the content of standard form 
terms.134 Others have defended disclosure when paired with substantive 
regulation of the architecture in which the information is presented.135 But 
many authors have argued, to the contrary, that disclosure is ineffective in 
policing terms.136 There is substantial empirical research showing that 
consumers do not read terms of standard form contracts before they agree to 
them,137 and what they read they do not understand.138 Thus, mandated 
                                                 
131 For a summary, see Robert Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORD. L. REV. 743 (2002). 
132 ALI, Principles of the Law: Software Contracts (2010); Hillman and O‘Rourke, 
Defending Disclosure, supra n. 15, at 106-108. 
133 Id. at  106. 
134 Id. at 107. 
135  M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(arguing that changes in website design can make reading terms more likely). 
136 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra n. 14, at 647 ; Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra n. 14, at  
13-21; Mann and Siebeneicher, supra n. 14, at 998-1001.  
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2010), available  at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1713860 (visited Jan. 4, 2012); Ben-Shahar and 
Schneider, supra n. 14, at 671-72; Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a 
Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 36-37 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Ctr. for 
Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443256 (same). 
138 Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL‘Y 
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transparency provides an illusory form of regulation: it discourages more 
substantive policing of terms while inundating consumers with information 
that they cannot, and will not, process. 
We suggest recasting this debate around the question of whether or not 
consumers think that the contract has begun. Our results provide some 
evidence that whether individuals are in a contract influences their self-
protective choices. They are more likely to behave in a self-interested way–to 
protect against exploitation, to contract against breach, to select trustworthy 
counterparties. But the subjective moment of contracting only sometimes 
tracks when a court will find a contract to be found. Parties can intentionally, 
or unintentionally, manipulate the negotiations to signal contractual agreement 
in its absence, thus lowering the defenses of their counterparties.139 
How might they do this? Well, one example comes from Hill itself. As 
Judge Easterbrook argued, terms which follow can be appreciated at leisure, 
rather than requiring a ―droning voice [providing contract terms that] would 
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers . . . . Customers as a 
group are better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as 
telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.‖140  
But of course this assumes that consumers are equally likely to protect 
themselves before and after they understand themselves to be in the contract. 
If, as we have argued, they are not, then Easterbrook‘s approach motivates 
sellers to encourage the belief by buyers that a contract exists–whether or not 
it does–and then send terms which would not have been agreed to in the first 
instance. 
Even courts that disagreed with Hill adopt its basic understanding of the 
importance of legal, rather than subjective, formation. Klocek v. Gateway, which is 
often paired with Hill in casebooks and treatises, rejects Judge Easterbrook‘s 
conclusion that UCC 2-207 doesn‘t apply in the absence of two literal forms.141 
But it apparently would have held that were there evidence from which one 
could draw an inference of assent from the consumers‘ receipt of the good,142 
the subsequent terms would have been incorporated in the bargain.143 Both 
courts assume that the psychological reaction to terms that follow ought to be 
much like the reaction of terms that coincide with bargaining: caveat emptor.  
But there is a danger in proceeding this way. A consumer who believes 
                                                                                                                            
REV. 233, 234, 237-38 (2002) 
139 Cf. Calo, supra note 135, at 17; Ben-Shahar and Schneider, supra n. 14, at 154. See also 
supra, note 108. 
140 Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149. 
141 104 F.Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000). 
142 See generally PERILLO, SUPRA N.  108, at 2.18. 
143 See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp.2d. 1332 (D.Kan. 2000); Rogers v. Dell, 38 
P.3d 826 (Okla. 2005). 
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herself to be in a contractual relationship may not protect herself in the same 
way as a consumer who is still in negotiations. We should be especially 
suspicious of terms when the subjective moment of contracting precedes the 
objective moment, or when there is evidence that one party has encouraged 
the other to believe that a contract is present when it isn‘t. 
We will illustrate this problem with two additional examples: one a classic 
chestnut, and one from the domain of electronic commerce.  
Imagine that Oliver writes Alice, and promises to satisfy Alice‘s paper 
needs for the coming year, the price to be fixed for the first three months, and 
the parties thereafter to negotiate monthly on the price and quantity required, 
with a cap at the market bulk standard.144 Alice agrees to this deal. After a 
month, Oliver sends Alice a written ―confirmation,‖ which fixes prices for the 
entire year. 
Under traditional contract law principles, the first month of dealing 
between Alice and Oliver is not a binding contract but rather an agreement to 
agree, imposing no more than an obligation to negotiate in good faith about 
future months.145  Only the following ―confirmation‖ provided the requisite 
certainty to permit contractual enforcement. Or to put it differently, had 
something gone wrong between the parties in that first month, neither likely 
could seek contractual recovery. That is so even though Alice probably 
believed herself to have entered into a morally binding commitment.  The 
agreement-to-agree doctrine thus may subject parties to the risk of exploitation 
in a way which has not previously been appreciated. Promisees will overinvest 
in such unenforceable bargains, even though the law provides no recourse at 
all. 
This can be expanded to electronic commerce as well. The traditional 
distinction between browsewrap and clickwrap gains further substance with 
our results in mind: browsewrap terms, which follow an agreement, are less 
likely to be read than clickwrap terms, which (mildly) precede it. Courts are 
more skeptical of browsewrap licenses, generally requiring terms to be 
conspicuous, while they are generally accepting of clickwrap terms.146  If 
consumers perceive themselves to have entered into a contract by clicking ―I 
agree,‖ this distinction seems entirely warranted.147   
                                                 
144 These facts are, of course, loosely based on Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v.  
Remington Paper & Power Co., 139  N.E.  470  (N.Y.  1923). 
145 PERILLO, SUPRA N.  108, at 2.9(4) 
146 See Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 836-848 (2007) 
 (summarizing difference between browsewrap and clickwrap cases). 
147 A more conventional (but related) argument holds that consumers can be induced to 
enter contracts online without even knowing that they are doing so, as the process lacks the 
ordinary off-line formalities.  Becher, supra n. 89, at 164-166.  
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But what if they don‘t?  After all, a consumer might fairly believe that they 
have not entered into a contract until a piece of software has finished 
downloading onto their machine, or when their payment is processed. Or they 
might believe that the contract occurred when they first clicked on a product 
to put it into their cart. The point is that the inquiry here isn‘t about when 
notice happens with respect to the legal moment of contracting, but when 
parties subjectively experience that contract as complete. That is an empirical 
question, which further work could illuminate.  
4.3.2 Promissory Estoppel 
 When should a disappointed plaintiff be able to bring a promissory estoppel 
claim?  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts requires the plaintiff to prove (1) the 
existence of a promise; (2) that the promisor reasonably expected to induce 
(and indeed did induce) action or forbearance; and (3) the presence of injustice 
in the absence of enforcement.148  Scholars have questioned whether courts 
should (and do) focus more on the first or second of these requirements. An 
early set of empirical studies argued that courts focus on the nature of the 
promise made, and ignored the promisee's reliance.149  Later work, led by Bob 
Hillman, suggested that detrimental reliance drove courts; in its absence, 
recovery was unlikely.150 The upshot is a doctrine which is highly controversial, 
always threatening, but never quite, swallowing up the remains of contract 
doctrine.151 We suggest that the law of promissory estoppel, like terms that 
follow later, ought to be understood in light of the promisee‘s understanding 
of the contract‘s legal effect. Promisees who believe that they are party to 
enforceable contracts cannot be relied upon to protect themselves. 
 In a previous Article, we argued that promissory estoppel‘s continued 
controversial nature might result from its distance from commonsense moral 
understanding of what makes breach of contract feel immoral. We explained 
that contractual breach could result in a feeling of being a ―sucker‖–one who 
was the victim of an intentional and exploitative decision to betray a 
                                                 
 148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
149 Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the 
“Invisible Handshake”, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The 
Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991). 
150 Robert Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and 
Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998); cf. Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of 
Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 669, 701-02 (2010) (arguing that courts justify themselves in terms of both promise and 
reliance). 
151 See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory 
Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981) (―[PE] has become perhaps the most radical and 
expansive development of this century in the law of promissory liability.‖); GRANT GILMORE, 
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 79 (1974). 
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relationship.152  Promissory estoppel, by contrast, focuses generally on the 
promisor‘s state of mind (her belief that the promise would or would not lead 
to reliance),153 and does not require the betrayal of an agreement that inspired 
trust.154   Thus, we concluded that ―promissory estoppel cases seem less likely 
to contain plaintiffs who experienced the psychological feeling of being 
suckered.‖155 A more realistic promissory estoppel doctrine would start with 
the promisee‘s subjective understanding, asking if he subjectively believed the 
promise was legally enforceable. Our results suggest how this approach, 
apparent in some cases,156 could reorient doctrine toward those promisees who 
were led to believe that they were in bargains, thus lowering their defenses to 
exploitation. 
 The consequence of this changed orientation would be a doctrine that 
focused on the promisor‘s efforts to lead the promisee on, and the promisee‘s 
own belief that she was in a legally enforceable contract. Consider – in this 
light – the famous case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores.157 Hoffman may be an 
outlier case in its suggestion that parties will routinely win back their reliance 
costs in promissory estoppel actions in the absence of any mutual agreement 
between the parties.158  But we suggest that conventional treatments of the case 
may be too quick to dismiss Hoffman's claim, and the court's outcome.  In 
Hoffman, Red Owl (the promisor) allegedly told Hoffman that his $18,000 
proposed investment in their franchise "would not be a problem."  If Hoffman 
believed that this response constituted a contractual commitment – even 
though it clearly was not one in the law's eyes – his later reliance might be more 
easily explained and defended.  Directing the law to ask directly about his 
subjective understanding of the promise might not be an ideal solution.159 But 
it would have the previously unexamined virtue of foregrounding the 
vulnerability that the subjective experience of being in a contract creates in lay 
promisees.   
                                                 
152 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is For Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 
1003 (2010). 
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4.4 Limitations  
Our study is subject to several limitations and possible criticisms. We 
discuss concerns regarding the scope of our findings, criticisms common to all 
survey research, the representativeness of our survey population, and the utility 
of examining lay psychology in contract law. 
Our response measures were either general attitudinal scales, or prompts 
asking subjects for their hypothetical willingness to pay (or accept) money. A 
typical concern with such research is that survey respondents without real 
monetary incentives will overstate their commitment to contracting, so as to 
signal that they are the kind of person who keeps promises.160 Of course there 
is considerable literature which finds, to the contrary, that attitudinal scales 
accurately predict behavior.161  But in real world contracts with more at stake, 
individuals may tend to behave in a more economically maximizing manner.  
Perhaps subjects in our experiments were motivated to demonstrate how 
important mere contract status was to them, and thus were even less likely to 
purchase precautions against breach. Further work, which triangulates across 
survey populations, includes laboratory games, real-money stimuli, and 
distinctive counterparties, could help build confidence in our findings.162   
Our two subject pools pose distinct questions about bias. Experiments 1 
and 2 were conducted on respondents drawn from workers at Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Recent research on AMT subjects has found them to be 
significantly more representative of the general population than the ordinary 
undergraduate samples.163  However, women are generally overrepresented–as 
we found–and subjects are slightly better educated than the population 
mean.164  This could raise concerns. In other areas of study, women and men 
exhibit different risk preferences (especially regarding financial risk).165  
However, we found no meaningful gender differences in responses. A more 
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pressing concern is that subjects recruited online to complete surveys may lack 
motivation to pay attention to the task.166  In our work, we dropped 
respondents who completed their tasks in a very short period of time, or who 
skipped questions, but future work could incorporate more robust 
manipulation checks against inattentive participants.167 
With respect to Experiment 3, which studied incoming law students, we 
face a different set of questions. Some have argued that individuals trained in 
law may be more attentive to the legal remedies surrounding contracting 
and/or less sensitive to the expressive power of contracting.168  Our subjects, 
who were recruited in the first week of their orientation, are unlikely to be 
similarly biased by legal doctrine.169  Anecdotally, law students are more risk 
averse than the population at large, and thus possibly more likely to purchase 
precautions against breach. It seems unlikely, however, this effect would be 
mediated by being in a contract. 
A different external validity objection presents in response to papers about 
contracts in particular. As the relational contracting school famously 
illustrated, contracting behavior by commercial parties can wildly unsettle prior 
expectations about the importance of law and legal rules.170 Thus, the 
argument goes, we ought to focus experimental work on the agents of 
sophisticated commercial parties, who are likely to be repeat players in contract 
litigation. For example, Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz, defending the 
primacy of the expectation interest, argued recently that experiments like the 
ones presented in this Article ought to be discounted in part because they 
study ―individual persons, not firms. A firm is more likely to exhibit behavior 
consistent with the maximization of monetary returns than an individual 
responding to a questionnaire.‖171     
We agree and disagree with this critique. It is quite useful to study the 
behavior of sophisticated commercial parties engaging in contracting–contract 
law gained immensely from the insights of the Wisconsin School. Bringing 
such parties into the laboratory, though logistically quite challenging, holds real 
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promise in expanding the burgeoning literature relating professionalism, 
agency, and behavior.172   
However, this argument cuts both ways. We note first that the extant 
literature has focused on how post-trial remedies will influence pre-breach 
precautionary behavior. That is, the literature assumes that almost all contracts 
are litigable. But in the kinds of contracts which are the subject of our 
experimental series, the availability of damage remedies for breach is practically 
irrelevant. No one will sue, or recover, in a contracts case with so little at stake 
outside the rough justice of small claims court. And, only moderately less 
controversially, even if these contracts were large enough to make suits 
economically worthwhile, lawsuits by individuals are likely to be driven 
reputational and emotional factors that aren‘t easy to predict ex ante.173  Thus, 
though studying the agents of repeat, commercially sophisticated, parties is 
quite useful, it would not tell us much about the behavior of lay players in 
typical consumer contracts, who are unlikely to ever experience contract 
remedies in action.174 
More generally, simply because the contracts we have described aren‘t 
likely to be litigated does not mean that they shouldn‘t bear on the makeup of 
doctrine. The theory of default rules rests on assumptions about the behavior 
of legally unsophisticated members of the population–both majoritarian and 
information-forcing penalty defaults, for instance, rest on (sometimes) 
informed guesses about the views of the population mean.175  As we described 
above, our understanding of offer-and-acceptance, promissory estoppel, and 
modification similarly rests on intuitions about how ―ordinary‖ people will 
behave. That those individuals will almost never actually show up to court to 
testify about their precontracting intuitions doesn‘t mean that such intuitions 
ought to be discounted. Indeed, it is a mark against the current literature on 
precautions that it focuses so heavily on how promisees and promisors will 
react to damage measures, when those remedies are unlikely to be known, 
appreciated, or experienced by the vast majority of individuals participating in 
commercial life.  
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Finally, some have argued that legal rules, if they drift too far from 
common moral intuitions, would come to be seen as illegitimate and thus less 
likely to influence behavior.176  This literature is admittedly controversial.177  
However, it is the case that if individuals were to come to believe that 
common contracting rules were written exclusively to respond to the views of 
sophisticated, repeat-player, commercial parties, then it is possible that they 
would come to distrust the rules which resulted from such elite inquiries. 
Indeed, doctrine would likely come to be seen as the product of capture, or, in 
layman‘s terms, corruption. Courts ought to be at least informed of how 
ordinary, legally-naïve citizens think about the kinds of contracts they typically 
enter into. What they do with such knowledge is another matter entirely. 
5. Conclusion 
Everyone knows that contract parties behave differently toward one 
another than do strangers. The question is why. The dominant paradigm in 
contract theory assumes that parties, forecasting their remedies with 
impressive precision, tailor their investment in the bargain and their behavior 
optimally to maximize their individual gains. This may 
 explained conventionally by transaction costs, or forecasted remedies 
following legally enforceable bargains. Instead, the moment of contracting 
resets the status quo and primes a cognitive script that favors trust in contract. 
This reframed understanding of self-protective behavior by promisees might 
help us to reorient some important questions in current doctrine. We are 
hopeful that this is the first step in the larger project of understanding why, 
and when, individuals surrender their armor and treat their contracts as 
partnerships.   
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